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Editor’s Note: The following essay is drawn from the Casad 
Comparative Law Lecture presented in September 2012 by Professor 
Patrick Glenn.  The Casad Lecture, held regularly at the University of 
Kansas School of Law School as a component of the school’s 
multifaceted International and Comparative Law Program, is named after 
Robert C. Casad and Sarah Casad in recognition of the special 
contributions that both have made to the Law School over many years, 
particularly in the area of comparative law.  Bob Casad’s service on the 
KU Law faculty, starting in 1959, reflected his deep dedication to both 
academic scholarship and classroom teaching, so that generations of 
students and practitioners have benefited from his contributions to civil 
procedure, particularly from a comparative perspective.  
Professor Casad became a college freshman at age sixteen, and by 
the age of twenty-one he had earned his undergraduate degree and a 
master’s degree from the University of Kansas.  He then went on to earn 
a juris doctor degree from the University of Michigan and an advanced 
law degree from Harvard.  Before Professor and Mrs. Casad moved to 
Lawrence in 1959, they lived for a short time in Winona, Minnesota 
where Professor Casad practiced law at the practice of Streater and 
Murphy.  
During their long association with KU, Professor and Mrs. Casad 
worked and lived overseas several times, including forays to Spain, 
Vienna, London, Japan, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Munich, Augsberg, 
Frankfort, and many other places.  In connection with some of those 
visits abroad, Professor Casad became fluent in Spanish and has 
undertaken extensive research and writing in that language—a sign of a 
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true legal comparativist.  Among Professor Casad’s most well-known 
scholarly works in English are Res Judicata in a Nutshell (1976) and 
Jurisdiction in Civil Actions (1998).  Professor Casad took emeritus 
status at the Law School in 1997 and has remained active in scholarship 
and faculty matters ever since.  
In keeping with common practice followed by the Kansas Law 
Review in publishing lectures of this sort, and consistent with the 
character of this Casad Comparative Law Lecture in particular, the 
following is structured more in the form of an essay than a traditional 
law journal article. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is a great pleasure to be here at the University of Kansas School of 
Law and an honor to give the Casad Comparative Law Lecture.  Bob 
Casad and I have toiled for many years together in the fields of civil 
procedure, private international law, and comparative law, and it is a 
particular pleasure to see Bob and Sarah Casad here this evening with 
members of their family. 
My topic is “The Cosmopolitan State,” and I think for most this topic 
is both novel and obscure.  So let me begin by saying what the topic does 
not mean, and what I will not be arguing.  I will not be arguing that states 
should declare themselves to be cosmopolitan, multicultural, 
consociational, or any other such expression meant to capture and even 
accentuate the diversity of law and legal structures within a state.  More 
particularly, and perhaps most emphatically, I will not be arguing that 
states should declare themselves to be legally pluralist through adoption 
of different personal laws (or statuts personnels) which coexist with the 
law of the state.  Many states of the world have done so in abandoning 
the idea of a uniform private law, as is the case with India, Israel, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, South Africa, and many more.1  Each of 
these states has adopted such a multiplicity of laws for its own particular 
reasons, and I do not think these reasons can be generalized.  Each of 
these states does, however, represent a general principle that it is for each 
state to articulate its own sources of law and, as Philip Allott has 
observed, each state is characterized by its “utter particularity” in choice 
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of sources of law and legal institutions.2  If these choices must be 
respected, and each state makes different choices, how then can it be 
appropriate to speak in general terms of the cosmopolitan state? 
The argument for the cosmopolitan state that I wish to make is 
general in that it transcends, or attempts to transcend, the particular state 
decisions that are made about legal sources and legal institutions.  The 
very general and broad argument is that all states are cosmopolitan in 
character, often in spite of themselves and of the choices they may have 
made.  Most people do not presently think that this is the case—for 
reasons that I will explore more fully later—but this is principally 
because the western theory of states has been formulated in terms of 
necessary equality and uniformity within states.  It is the notion of a 
“nation-state” that has largely prevailed.  To overcome the notion of 
national uniformity, I therefore have to look in a very detailed way at 
how different states and their law are actually cosmopolitan in character.  
In other words, I am advancing a very broad and general proposition 
that needs to be supported in a detailed way with respect to the utter 
particularity of each state and how each state is cosmopolitan.  So please 
bear with me as I explore four propositions. 
II. PROPOSITION NUMBER ONE: THERE ARE NO NATION-STATES 
My first proposition is that there never has been and there never will 
be a “nation-state,” in spite of the appeal of that term.  It is true that 
states today are known as “nation-states,” in both public and academic 
discourse.  The expression also has a nice ring, more pleasing, I would 
say, than the word “state.”  The single word “state” is too abstract, too 
bureaucratic, and too suggestive of Hobbes’s Leviathan for popular 
adoption.  It is worse if the word is capitalized, as “State.”3  In the United 
States, the word is avoided as much as possible in favor of “the 
administration,” and it was even read out of much academic debate a few 
years ago.  It has since been brought “back in.”4  The term is unavoidable 
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at the international level, and it is “states” that are failing, failed, or 
fragile, not simple governments.5 
By contrast, the term “nation-state” does have a nice, even warm 
feeling to it.  In using the term, we convey the message that “this is our 
state, the state of our nation,” or that it is the state that belongs somehow 
to a particular group of people.  It seems, then, that the appeal of the 
expression “nation-state”—short, punchy, and congenial as it is—has 
contributed enormously to the success of the concept.  The expression 
“cosmopolitan state,” by contrast, is probably too long for general 
adoption.  If there are no nation-states, however, the time has come to 
search for different language.  It is time to face the reality of the 
situation. 
The reality is that what began as an essentially romantic idea6 in 
eighteenth century France—the idea that “la nation” should have its own 
legal and political structures—is an idea that has failed.  We have been 
trying to make it succeed for over two centuries now, but it has not 
succeeded.  It is simply not the case that there has ever been a nation-
state, and we may now therefore draw the conclusion that there never 
will be. 
Of course, I am envisaging a “nation” according to its classic 
definition, which is that it is a homogeneous people united by language, 
religion, and even ethnicity.  That is how “la nation” has been 
historically conceived.7  Thus, to have a “nation-state” which is in fact 
true to this bringing together—this confluence of the institutions of both 
a state and a people—you have to find a nation that satisfies the 
requirement of homogeneity, and it must coincide with a given state 
structure.8  Where can you find a nation-state? 
I have looked, even at great length, for a nation-state.  There are 
many examples given, though usually without supporting documentation.  
Finland, for example, is often given as an example of a nation-state, 
because the Finnish language is unique, being related, and only vaguely, 
to Hungarian.  As a result, only the Finns speak Finnish.  Yet Finland, 
like my jurisdiction of Quebec, is a bilingual jurisdiction.9  Finland has 
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always had a Swedish minority, and hence Swedish has been made an 
official language.  There are two linguistic “nations.” 
Astonishingly enough, Germany is often cited as a nation-state on 
the ground that Germany has historically looked to ethnicity as a 
definition of nationality.  That is an oversimplification, but it is the case 
that Germany has historically adhered more to a jus sanguinis principle 
than a jus soli principle in defining nationality.  Citing Germany as a 
nation-state, however, runs counter to both contemporary and historical 
reality.  The contemporary state of Germany has a very large foreign-
born population, dating back to the 1950s when a massive influx of 
people developed as a means of providing workers for the German 
economy.  Even more generally, Germany has historically been 
populated with minorities scattered around the German borders, 
including a very large population of Danes in the north—that is, persons 
who are Danish by everything that they identify themselves by.  So 
Germany—despite being often cited as a nation-state because of the jus 
sanguinis principle—is in fact a cosmopolitan state and is becoming 
much more cosmopolitan today than it ever has been in the past. 
Asian states that have resisted immigration are often cited as 
examples of nation-states.  This is notably the case for Japan.  Yet Japan 
has its Koreans, its Chinese, and its Ainu of the island of Hokkaido.10  Its 
population would be largely both Buddhist and Shinto, but ten percent of 
the population is Christian or other.  So, it is impossible to sustain the 
proposition that the Japanese islands have been populated by a single 
people united in language, ethnicity, and religion.  It never has been the 
case, and it never will be the case.  South Korea is twenty-six percent 
Christian.  North Korea has a “small Chinese community”; its population 
is both Buddhist and Confucian and includes “some Christian and 
Syncretic Chondogyo.”11 
In short, several prominent states often cited as nation-states—
Finland, Germany, Japan, and North Korea—all fail the test because they 
have never been able to overcome the inherent diversity of population in 
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their territories.  These are all, however, relatively large states, and social 
diversity may be directly related to the size of a state’s population and 
territory.  A nation-state appears intuitively more probable in smaller 
jurisdictions.  The smallest state in the world appears to be the island of 
Tuvalu in the South Pacific.  It is juridically equivalent to the United 
States of America and is accordingly represented at the United Nations.  
It is a state, although it has a population of only some 10,000 people.  
Tuvalu, however, is a more interesting place than it initially appears to 
be.  It is ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse, with a 
population largely Polynesian but partly Micronesian, belonging to the 
Church of Tuvalu (Congregational) but also other religions, and speaking 
both the official languages of Tuvalu and English and the unofficial 
languages of Samoan and Kiribati.  Human diversity appears manifest in 
even the smallest of the world’s states. 
I think, therefore, that we cannot succeed in our search for a nation-
state.  There are diversities and minorities in all populations, and it does 
not matter for our purposes how small the minority is.  One person is 
sufficient to give rise to the problem of state treatment of minority 
populations.  The great debate in Europe presently is the treatment of the 
Roma, the so-called Gypsy people.  The Roma people of France—whose 
numbers constitute less than one percent of the overall French 
population, but who are highly mobile—are creating significant 
difficulties for the French state in its relations with the European Union.  
Successive French governments have undertaken removal from France of 
members of the Roma population, and the French action is challenged by 
the European Union.12  Under the circumstances, this may or may not 
constitute a form of ethnic cleansing, but ethnic cleansing has been 
widespread in the world.  It is the dark side of the nation-state. 
I therefore draw the conclusion that there are no nation-states.  There 
never have been; there never will be.  All states are therefore 
cosmopolitan.  The most successful states, moreover, are the states that 
have been most successful in dealing with their own internal diversity.  
One such state is the United States of America.  I have this on no less an 
authority than Justice Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, who 
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said in Employment Division v. Smith that the United States is a 
“cosmopolitan nation.”13  Of course, he meant “state,” not “nation.”  
There is no nation here, in the sense of a homogeneous population.  The 
United States is a successful cosmopolitan state because its legal and 
political project has succeeded—most of the time on most questions—in 
having the people here think in terms of what has been called 
“constitutional patriotism,” most frequently associated with the German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas.  Civic identity thus largely prevails over 
other identities.  There is collaboration in working with diverse peoples.  
So the states that have been seen as the most successful republican and 
united enterprises are in a sense paradoxically the states that have been 
most successful in dealing with their inherently cosmopolitan character. 
III. PROPOSITION NUMBER TWO: COSMOPOLITANISM DOES NOT IMPLY 
UNIVERSALISM 
My second proposition is that it is possible to be cosmopolitan 
without being universalist.  I say this because in the world today there is 
a very rich and very impressive literature of so-called cosmopolitan 
theory.  In the United Kingdom, for example, David Held is prominent in 
that literature.14  In the United States, it is Thomas Pogge of Columbia 
University and Martha Nussbaum of the University of Chicago who are 
prominent.15  These are philosophers and political theorists who are 
advancing with great subtlety and great distinction the idea that we 
should think about the world in terms of cosmopolitanism.  What that 
means for them is the sentiment best expressed by Diogenes in Greece: 
“I am a citizen of the world.”  It is a beautiful, classic, ringing 
statement—although, as I will shortly explain, the reason Diogenes said 
it is a subject of some intriguing debate.  Cosmopolitan theoreticians say 
today that we should regard each individual as a citizen of the world.  
They urge that each citizen should be treated on an equal basis with 
every other citizen of the world.  Essentially, therefore, we should, 
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according to Thomas Pogge, be engaging in revenue distribution 
throughout the world  and we have to find some way of doing this.16 
Hence, the cosmopolitanism being circulated today has enormous 
implications for our present notions of national law and states as sources 
of law.  We should bear in mind, however, that there is a real debate 
about what Diogenes meant in saying that he was “a citizen of the 
world.”  Diogenes was a Cynic, and in his day Cynics were those kinds 
of people who didn’t believe in anything and rejected all kinds of 
authority.  So, when the citizens of the city of Diogenes came to 
Diogenes and said to him, “these are the responsibilities of the citizens of 
this city,” Diogenes is reported to have said in reply, “I am a citizen of 
the world.”  The implication, of course, is that Diogenes did not have a 
duty to fulfill the responsibilities of a citizen of the city because his 
citizenship lay outside the city. 
This is a quite different meaning than the one cosmopolitan 
theoreticians usually give to Diogenes’s statement.  Interestingly, there 
are some French dictionary definitions of the eighteenth century that 
apparently construed Diogenes’s statement in the less flattering way and 
accordingly defined a “cosmopolitan” as a bad citizen, on the ground that 
such a person shirked local obligation in the name of larger forms of 
obligation.17  My argument, however, is that one can be cosmopolitan 
without being universalist in character and without being a bad citizen.  
For this I rely on what I take to be the usual meaning of “cosmopolitan,” 
which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as “[h]aving the 
characteristics which arise from, or are suited to, a range over many 
different countries.”18  This ordinary language understanding of 
cosmopolitanism has been defended with great subtlety by Stephen 
Toulmin, who in the mid-twentieth century argued that “cosmopolitan” 
means what the word indicates—it is a combination of “cosmos,” hence 
“cosmo,” and “polis,” or polity—so that “cosmopolitan” means it is 
possible to have a harmonious bringing together of the cosmos and a 
particular polity.19  This understanding of the world implies a notion of 
harmonious coexistence rather than of obligatory universality. 
                                                          
 16  See Pogge, supra note 15, at 199–202 (proposing a Global Resource Tax on consumption, 
with proceeds “to be used toward the emancipation of the present and future global poor”). 
 17  DICTIONNAIRE DE L’ACADÉMIE FRANÇOISE (4th ed. 1762) (defining “cosmopolite”).  By 
the fifth edition in 1798, however, the wind had turned and the cosmopolitan had become someone 
who “sees the universe as their country.”  DICTIONNAIRE DE L’ACADÉMIE FRANÇOISE (5th ed. 1798) 
(defining “cosmopolite”). 
 18  3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 985 (2d ed. 1989). 
 19  E.g., STEPHEN TOULMIN, COSMOPOLIS 67−68 (1990). 
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Given this ordinary language understanding of cosmopolitanism, the 
cosmopolitan state is not a state of domination that purports to impose its 
law on the rest of the world.  It is not a world state or a hegemonic state.  
Instead, the cosmopolitan state is a state that has dealt more or less 
successfully with the inevitable internal and external diversity within 
which all states must function.  There is no cosmopolitan universal law, 
but there are cosmopolitan attitudes and cosmopolitan methods.  There 
are also cosmopolitan officials who know, in light of the utter 
particularity of each state, how to reconcile in a particular state claims 
for exception to and application of the law and normativity of the 
majority.  In short, the cosmopolitan state has to address the challenge of 
balance. 
IV. PROPOSITION NUMBER THREE: WE NEED NOT WORRY ABOUT THE 
COSMOPOLITAN STATE 
Having explored my first two propositions—(a) that there never has 
been and there never will be a nation state, because all states are in fact 
cosmopolitan, and (b) that it is possible to be cosmopolitan without being 
universal—I turn to a third proposition that I believe is more comforting 
than the first two.  My third proposition is this: we needn’t worry about 
recognizing the cosmopolitan state.  It is true that there is a great deal of 
angst in the world and a lot of antagonistic discussion about 
globalization, foreign influence, empires, hegemonic behavior, terrorism, 
and all of the things that occupy us in present circumstances.  Of course 
there is reason to worry about acts of violence.  But I think that some of 
the violence in the contemporary world can be related, although I have 
no proof of this, to three hundred years of teaching that the ideal legal 
and political structure is a nation-state.  We have been teaching 
populations this for three hundred years, so people are naturally going to 
accept it as true and object, sometimes violently, to human diversity 
within their state. 
We can’t fault people for accepting orthodox instruction—that is, for 
accepting the view that the true states are nation-states.  Likewise, we 
can’t fault people for trying to ensure that their state achieves the status 
of a nation-state.  If their state is obviously not a nation-state, they feel 
they are correct in sustaining measures that would correct that situation.  
So, you have a kind of reaction in today’s world—which features very 
high population mobility—as a result of which local populations express 
resistance or antagonism towards recently arrived populations.  This 
phenomenon is everywhere.  It is to be expected because this teaching 
has been out there since the time of the French romantics. 
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What we should worry about is the violence that happens in 
association with the antagonism of local populations toward recently 
arrived populations.  One way, over time, to reduce the violence would 
be to abandon the notion of the nation-state.  A message has to be 
developed about the necessity of living with human diversity, because it 
is impossible to do otherwise. 
The notion of the inherently cosmopolitan nature of states may 
therefore offset in some measure the dark side of the nation-state, and we 
should not worry about it.  At the same time, we should not worry about 
the general phenomenon that the state is losing its place in the face of 
what we call “globalization.”  I’ve been very impressed recently reading 
a book by Hilary Lawson, entitled Closure: A Story of Everything.20  It 
could perhaps be just as aptly titled “Closure: The Answer to 
Everything.”  I found it a very theoretical and abstract read, but decided 
it was relevant to present circumstance and to thinking about the 
cosmopolitan state.  Lawson says two things.  The first is that the only 
way we can understand the world is to effect some kind of closure.21  If 
you want to do anything, if you want to think about anything, you must 
narrow the focus.  You’ve got to decide that this is your problem, this is 
your unit of political construction, this is your legal problem, or whatever 
it might be.  You cannot function without a form of closure that allows 
you to think about the object of the closure.  Once you’ve effected a 
closure around a problem, concept, or thing, then it becomes possible to 
study it. 
This is an interesting proposition.  The more important and second 
part of Lawson’s project, however, is to say that closures can never be 
definitive.22  Closures can never be definitive because when effecting 
closure, you necessarily effect a closure around something that is part of 
a much larger field of what Lawson calls “texture.”  You are faced 
constantly with a reality of undistinguished texture.  To understand 
anything about that reality, you must effect a kind of closure.  But the 
closure effect is surrounded in an ongoing way by the texture that lies 
beyond the closure you have effected.  That texture, beyond your closure, 
is an ongoing incitation to new and different forms of closure.  So, no 
closure can be definitive.23  Closures are thus never definitive because 
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they can never be rendered immune from the attraction of texture not 
included in the initial closure. 
Lawson would therefore have given the answer to everything that 
concerns us about the cosmopolitan state.  The modern state is a form of 
closure.  Consider what has happened in Europe over the course of 
several centuries.  Throughout much of European legal history, there 
were recognizably cosmopolitan states with ecclesiastical law, 
commercial law, and, in some measure, Roman law running across what 
are now state borders.  There were many horizontal webs of pan-
European law.  Indeed, some of those webs of law ran across the Atlantic 
as well, as explained by Mary Sarah Bilder in a recent book entitled The 
Transatlantic Constitution, which describes the exchange of information 
over the Atlantic between colonizing countries of Europe and North 
American forms of government.24  These horizontal webs of law, this 
texture of normativity that ran across what we now know as national 
boundaries, suffered greatly in the process of the territorial and national 
closures of the seventeenth through twentieth centuries. 
This process of political and legal closure had its precedents, of 
course.  Before the contemporary state there were other forms of closure.  
We have had, in earlier times, closure around tribes as the major form of 
legal and political organization.  Tribes have now lost much of their 
significance because the closure of the tribe has given way for many 
people to other, more tempting forms of closure.  But tribes are still with 
us, as shown by the fact that North American state law recognizes the 
law of aboriginal peoples.  We argue about how much it does so, but it is 
the case that the United States of America, Mexico, and Canada all in 
some measure recognize the unwritten law of the chthonic populations 
that were here before the Europeans.25 
Another example from the past: in feudal times we had closure 
around the manor.  The manor was the basic form of organization of 
feudal societies.  I don’t know how many manors are still operating 
effectively today, but the manor has lost a great deal, if not all, of its 
significance.  It yielded to ongoing attraction of the texture that 
surrounded it.  It gave way to city-states, so called because they were the 
                                                                                                                       
 
opposed to the outside. 
 24  MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION (2004); see also H. PATRICK 
GLENN, ON COMMON LAWS (2005) (explaining the notion of common law as an instrument in this 
process). 
 25  For the underlying, cosmopolitan character of the ongoing relations between European 
settlers and those who preceded the Europeans, see H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE 
WORLD 61–98 (4th ed. 2010). 
746 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
product of a form of political and legal organization meant to be in large 
measure self-sufficient.  The city-states and the manors then gave way to 
kingdoms.  There were even so-called absolutist kingdoms, such as that 
of Louis XIV, the Sun King.  But those kingdoms couldn’t resist other 
forms of closure that emerged from the texture surrounding them.26  So 
we saw the emergence of the contemporary state as a territorially 
bounded exclusive source of law for what is meant (or imagined) to be a 
uniform population within it. 
We are finding today that the contemporary state is losing its grip.  
States are tempted by texture beyond themselves.  Here is an illustration: 
states today recognize judgments emerging from arbitration, whereas in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, arbitration was seen as 
contrary to state public policy.27  States now, however, see arbitration as 
an ally in the process of dispute settlement, so the state’s exclusivity in 
dispute resolution has been abandoned in favor of adoption of the texture 
of private resolution of disputes, particularly in the form of resolution of 
commercial disputes. 
In short, the contemporary state today is declining in influence.  
Don’t worry.  Something will take its place.  We don’t know what that 
will be.  It is even possible that there is nothing novel left to take its 
place.  It is unlikely we will have a world government.  Kant was very 
skeptical about world government.  His idea of a cosmopolitan law was 
simply a right to travel from one place to another.28  It certainly did not 
involve world government or world law.  There may not be anything 
beyond the state, and it may be that we have to live with what we have.  
All previous forms of closure are still with us, in some measure.  There is 
                                                          
 26  For the challenge, moreover, to the reality of absolutist government in France and 
elsewhere, see 2 J. ELLUL, HISTOIRE DES INSTITUTIONS 339 (1956) (noting ongoing “feudal 
structures”); A. LLOYD MOOTE, THE REVOLT OF THE JUDGES 36–63 (1971) (noting the recalcitrance 
of royal officials, and the Fronde, making a “mockery” of absolute monarchy).  For an overview of 
recent historical writing to this effect, see Michael P. Breen, Law, Society and the State in Early 
Modern France, 83 J. MOD. HIST. 346, 353 (2011) (noting a “wave of revisionist studies,” and 
Bourbons “cooperating and colluding” rather than commanding). 
 27  For national prohibitions, see Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial Arbitration—Practice 
and Prospects, in THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN EUROPE: FUTURE 
PROSPECTS 269, 273 (Daniel Bardonnet ed., Hague Academy of International Law 1991) (noting 
that the French Court of Cassation refused to recognize arbitration clauses for future disputes in 
1843); see also Detlev F. Vagts, Dispute-Resolution Mechanisms in International Business, 203 
RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 62–63 (1987) (discussing international hostility towards arbitration that has 
subsided over time). 
 28  IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE 137–42 (M. Campbell Smith trans., 1903) (1795) 
(“This right to hospitality, however—that is to say, the privilege of strangers arriving on foreign 
soil—does not amount to more than what is implied in a permission to make an attempt at 
intercourse with the original inhabitants.”). 
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no progressive evolution, but simply different opinions and different 
instantiations of them.  So the state may be as good as it gets, and the 
most successful states are the most cosmopolitan in dealing with the 
human diversity that they inevitably confront.  This leads me to the 
comforting news of my fourth proposition. 
V. PROPOSITION NUMBER FOUR: STATES ARE BECOMING MORE 
EVIDENTLY COSMOPOLITAN 
Let me therefore advance my fourth and final proposition, which is 
that against a background of what we call “globalization,” over which no 
one has control, states are becoming more and more evidently 
cosmopolitan in character.  They are adjusting to the texture which 
surrounds them.  The cosmopolitan state will thus become recognized as 
a successor to the nation-state, even though the nation-state has never 
existed.  Generally, I think this is a salutary development because it 
means we should stop teaching people that there are means to ensure 
ethnic, linguistic, and religious uniformity.  There are no such means, 
despite the many attempts to find them. 
How are states becoming more and more evidently cosmopolitan?  
Let me advance three ways: through cosmopolitan citizens, cosmopolitan 
sources of law, and cosmopolitan logic or thought. 
First, consider the notion of cosmopolitan citizens.  Franklin 
Roosevelt felt that dual citizenship was a “self-evident absurdity” in the 
first half of the twentieth century, and national laws reflected that 
hostility to multiple national loyalties.29  Some states today maintain an 
exclusivity of citizenship, but the notion is in rapid decline, and the 
movement towards multiple citizenship appears irreversible. In Europe, 
everyone is both a national citizen and a European citizen, and all but 
five states now allow dual national citizenships.  Europe is symptomatic 
of a world-wide phenomenon.30  The movement attracts general 
approbation as a means of facilitating naturalization and advancing 
integration.  In part, this trend toward recognizing multiple nationalities 
reflects the theoretical objection of Amartya Sen to the unique 
                                                          
 29  PETER J. SPIRO, BEYOND CITIZENSHIP 61 (2008); see also GERARD-RENÉ DE GROOT & 
HILDEGARD SCHNEIDER, DIE ZUNEHMENDE AKZEPTANZ VON FÄLLEN MEHRFACHER 
STAATSANGEHÖRIGKEIT IN WESTERN EUROPA 65–66 (2006) (noting the early twentieth century 
view that one could no more have two citizenships than two mothers). 
 30  Christian Joppke, Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn in Europe?, 2 L. & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 1, 5 (2008); see also THOMAS FAIST ET AL., DUAL CITIZENSHIP IN AN AGE OF MOBILITY, 
app. B (2008) (listing more than fifty states now permitting dual citizenship explicitly or recognizing 
to some extent), http:// www.migrationpolicy.org/transatlantic/docs/faist-final.pdf. 
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categorization of people.  Sen argues that if you insist on categorizing 
people in only one way, conflict inevitably follows.  Conflict would be 
“parasitic” on such unique categorization.31  More cosmopolitan notions 
of citizenship would therefore reduce the violence that flows from 
forcing human beings (who answer back) into large and exclusive 
categories. 
There is not only a growing phenomenon of multiple citizenship in 
the world, but also an accompanying phenomenon of gradated 
citizenship.  Specialists in the law of citizenship in the United States tell 
us that there is now a whole range of citizenship status.  There are people 
in the country who are not full citizens but are not aliens, and United 
States law would be decidedly “ambivalent,” and not uniformly hostile, 
towards the alien.32  There are different forms of entitlement attaching 
under state and federal law to different levels of attachment to the 
country.  The word “denizen” is now coming back into use to describe 
someone who is neither here nor there, straddling the dichotomy between 
citizen and noncitizen. 
The second way in which states are becoming more obviously 
cosmopolitan is through use of a more cosmopolitan range of sources of 
law.  This has provoked a large and splendid debate in the United States 
about the practice in the Supreme Court, apparently including some 
3,000 law review articles.33  What’s happening, of course, is that some 
Justices on the Supreme Court use foreign or international sources, and 
then there is debate about whether they should be doing it.  Some of 
them keep doing it anyway.  What those Justices are doing is reminding 
the jurisdiction and the rest of the Court that there are different views on 
the matter in question.  Of course, it doesn’t matter whether those 
Justices are in the majority or minority, because either way the 
information comes out.  There is a reality of such cosmopolitan use of 
sources in spite of the wonderfully rich debate for and against the 
practice. 
It is not necessary, moreover, for a court to cite foreign sources to be 
cosmopolitan in its practice.  The debate in the United States plays out 
over citation practices because judges in the United States are free to cite 
whatever sources they choose.  It is possible, however, to consider 
                                                          
 31  AMARTYA SEN, IDENTITY AND VIOLENCE, at xii, xv, 10 (2007). 
 32  See LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 37–38, 49 (2006) (showing an 
ascending scale of rights for aliens as identity with society increases, and discussing how aliens 
receive full due process in criminal proceedings yet are possibly denied Medicaid benefits). 
 33  Roger P. Alford, Lower Courts and Constitutional Comparativism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 
647, 647 (2008). 
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cosmopolitan sources of law without actually citing them and to be very 
influenced by them.  The French Court of Cassation, for example, never 
cites authority other than French legislation, and it is sparing in its use of 
that.  It does not cite cases, from anywhere, given the strict form of 
writing of judgments that has prevailed in France.  Despite that, the 
French Court of Cassation has become an extremely cosmopolitan court.  
Without citing any non-French materials—and we have this on record—
the judges of the court will, before deciding any case that is important in 
law, engage in extensive research (in the court’s large research 
department) on the law of other European countries and even further 
afield.34  Without citing foreign sources, the French Court of Cassation is 
probably a more cosmopolitan court than the United States Supreme 
Court, which does.  You have to look beyond visible practices, if you 
can, to determine how national institutions engage with the world. 
The cosmopolitan character of French judicial practice extends 
beyond the Court of Cassation.  I recently had the privilege of 
supervising a doctoral thesis of a French student looking at French and 
Quebec law on how French civil law judges deal with religious law 
claims.35  Of course France is a country of secular laïcité.  In France 
there is only the law of the French state.  But French judges get seized 
with these cases involving religious issues because there’s such a large 
population that sees religious law as normative, whatever their religious 
belief is.  Accordingly, French judges have to deal with the cases.  How 
do they deal with these cases if they cannot apply religious law?  They 
are very cosmopolitan in doing so and deploy a number of judicial 
techniques.  For example, they subsume—that’s the language of my 
doctoral student—religious law claims under civil law rules.  So if 
parties agree to an obligation that is imposed by religious law, it can be 
treated as a civil law contractual obligation.  From the perspective of the 
French state it is a contract; from the perspective of the parties it is a 
claim founded ultimately on religious law. 
A further cosmopolitan device of French judges is the conversion of 
religion to fact.  The French judge cannot apply religious law but it is a 
fact that parties before them are litigating a question involving religious 
law.  There is therefore a “fait religieux,” a religious fact, and the judges 
decide the case on the facts before them.  For instance, if a person wants 
                                                          
 34  Guy Canivet, The Use of Comparative Law Before the French Private Law Courts, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW BEFORE THE COURTS 181, 193 (Guy Canivet ed., 2004) (“[D]eference . . . to the 
self-sufficiency of national law is now obsolete . . . .”). 
 35  CHRISTELLE. LANDHEER-CIESLAK, LA RELIGION DEVANT LES JUGES FRANÇAIS ET 
QUÉBÉCOIS DE DROIT CIVIL (2007). 
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to change her French name to a Muslim name because she is converting 
to the Islamic faith, then she has an interest in the changing of the name, 
which is a fact that can be appreciated by the French court, and the 
change of name will be ordered.  These are very subtle intellectual 
devices being used by judges who must respect public secularity but who 
as judges are required to do justice between the parties.  They succeed in 
doing both. 
The third way in which states are becoming more cosmopolitan in 
their operation is through the development of cosmopolitan logic.  How 
should one think about these problems?  Western lawyers and western 
people have been taught to think in terms of classical logic.  There are 
so-called “laws of thought.”36  There is a so-called “law” of 
noncontradiction, to the effect that you cannot assert contradictory 
propositions.  To do so is not “thinking like a lawyer.”  Perhaps more 
importantly, there is the “law” of the excluded middle: A or not-A.  
Between two contradictory propositions, say the classical logicians, there 
is no middle ground.  This is very depressing news for lawyers, faced 
with the important task of finding some area of middle ground over a 
vast number of cases. 
Why is it logically the case that there is an excluded middle?  It 
flows from the basic assumptions of classical logic.  Take me, for 
example.  I am Patrick Glenn.  Classical logic treats me as A, a much 
crisper notion than the real Patrick Glenn.  From my perspective, the rest 
of the world is not Patrick Glenn, or not-A.  Thus it becomes logically 
“Patrick Glenn” or “not-Patrick Glenn” and there is an excluded middle: 
there is nothing between “Patrick Glenn” and “not-Patrick Glenn.”  Why 
is that logically necessary?  Because “not-Patrick Glenn” starts exactly at 
the (crisp) border of Patrick Glenn and goes on out forever; it is galactic 
in character.  The “not-Patrick Glenn” eats up all possibility of a middle 
ground.  Classical logicians tell us this is how we must think, once there 
has been formulation of initial, crisp and contradictory propositions, and 
the teaching of this logic has been very influential in efforts to construct 
the legal unity thought necessary for a nation-state.  Kelsen relied on it 
explicitly, and codifiers were much influenced by it.37 
There are, however, what are being called the “new logics” in the 
world.  I recently discovered, to my initial chagrin but eventual pleasure, 
                                                          
 36  For the (relatively recent) development of such “classical” logic, see GLENN, supra note 1, 
ch. 14. 
 37  HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 206 (Max Knight trans., 1989) (1960) (discussing 
“the Principle of the Exclusion of Contradictions”). 
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a new 700-page volume entitled The Many Valued and Nonmonotonic 
Turn in Logic.38  For the non-logically-trained reader it is impossible to 
read in a lifetime.  Much of it is written in notational form.  The essential 
message of the book, however, is that we needn’t take classical logic and 
the “law” of the excluded middle as we have taken it.  That is because a 
more subtle view of the world does not accept that boundaries are always 
crisp.  Quantum physics is now telling us this, and we already know that 
normative propositions are always fuzzy in terms of their field of 
application.  All need not be mutually exclusive.  There can therefore be 
a many-valued logic, in which multiple truths can be sustained and a 
middle ground found between them.  This is good news for lawyers, 
though they may have known it all the time. 
To generalize: you can accept contradictions and live with them.  
You can accept a right to freedom of expression and a right to privacy 
and everything then depends on where particular cases are situated 
within the field defined by those contradictory general principles.  
Logicians are beginning to recognize that the real world is much subtler 
than a world composed of As and not-As.  It really is possible, as legal 
practice tells us, to find included middles. 
The more and more populations are diverse and the more and more 
contradictory propositions are advanced, the more we have to think in 
terms of cosmopolitan logic.  There is now such a logic, and we no 
longer need be concerned (always) with thinking like lawyers the way 
lawyers have often been taught to think.  It’s an age of rethinking 
thinking, in states that are more and more recognizably cosmopolitan. 
Thank you for your attention and once again for the invitation to 
deliver this Casad Comparative Law Lecture. 
 
                                                          
 38  8 HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF LOGIC, THE MANY VALUED AND NONMONOTONIC TURN 
IN LOGIC (Dov M. Gabbay & John Woods eds., 2007). 
